refused to find that the "mentally retarded" or juveniles were categorically exempt from the death penalty in opinions that both embodied the "national consensus" 5 test for death penalty restrictions and questioned its exclusivity as the determinate measure of cruel and unusual punishment. 6 In the decade that followed, the ground began to shift under the Court's jurisprudence in a number of ways. Coalitions opposed to the death penalty expanded to encompass international human rights advocates, dedicated as amicus curiae or pro bono counsel. This coalition highlighted in its advocacy the United States' growing isolation in its official acceptance of the punishment. 7 The 2002 landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia invigorated categorical exclusions from the death penalty, recognizing that the "mentally retarded" could not be subject to the harshest form of punishment. 8 Roper v. Simmons added juvenile offenders to the categorical exclusions. 9 In 2008, rape of a child when the crime did not result and was not intended to result in the victim's death was also excluded. 10 In the four years after Roper, the Court would protect juvenile offenders from life without parole, first for nonhomicidal offenses, 11 then for any offense. 12 The Montgomery v. Louisiana decision on January 25, 2016 applied the prohibition on life without parole for juvenile offenders retroactively, releasing prisoners who had spent their entire "adult" lives behind bars. 13 In addition, the Court found itself mired after Furman in what one commentator described as "an unparalleled level of constitutional micromanagement" as to how the death penalty can be imposed procedurally and when it can be imposed based on the nature of the offense and the status of the offender.
14 In the October 2015 term alone, the Court granted certiorari in a consolidated trio of cases and an additional case raising such procedural issues. 16 In the almost inevitable 5-4 split, the Court refused to find that the specific method of execution, a three-drug protocol beginning with midazolam, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 17 The decision is at best a Pyrrhic victory for the death penalty, however, given the specificity of the method in question. More importantly, the majority opinion was largely eclipsed by Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, which called for total abolition of the death penalty. 18 The conflict evidenced by the dissenting opinion in Glossip shows the need for a "global realism" recognizing that in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, consideration of international legal norms and political realities is unavoidable. The method of execution itself necessarily resulted from foreign drug suppliers' refusal to continue supplying drugs for execution purposes, and Justice Breyer's dissent again brought to the forefront the United States' isolation in its acceptance of the death penalty. 19 Glossip v. Gross, thus, may be the beginning of the end of the death penalty, due to factors compelling the Supreme Court to hold that the death penalty is a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. First, constitutional legal analysis has shifted steadily from the "national consensus" 20 analysis to proportionality and penological purposes served in Eighth Amendment cases. Second, mounting empirical evidence shows no national consensus in favor of the death penalty. Third, there is a renewed recognition that decisionmaking in capital cases is arbitrarily applied no matter what procedural WALL STREET JOURNAL (October 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-docketloaded-with-death-penalty-cases-1443999113.
16. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) .
See id.
18. See id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. See infra notes 177-217 and accompanying text. As this article focuses on Breyer's dissent as a roadmap for challenging the death penalty in the Supreme Court, it does not address the issue of the exorbitant costs of pursuing the death penalty compared to the benefits which has been the focus of much commentary. See, e.g., Adam Gershowitz, An NTSB for Capital Punishment, 47 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 151, 154 (2014) ("Certainly, as a matter of pure utility, the cost of capital punishment-arbitrariness, discrimination, and actual dollars spent-appears to be vastly greater than the benefits (primarily questionable claims of deterrence) it tangibly provides to society."); see also id. at 153 n.17 (citing Corinna Barrett Lain, The Virtues of Thinking Small, 67 U. MIAMI L. REv. 397, 408-09 (2013) for explaining that cost was a factor in the decision of five states to repeal their death penalty statutes). See also Charles Blow, Eye-for-an-Eye Incivility, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2014, at A23 (quoting Professor Jeffrey A. Fagan that " [T] he price of obtaining convictions and executions ranges from $1.5 million to $5 million per case (in current dollars), compared to less than $1 million for each killer sentenced to life without parole.").
20. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
prerequisites the Court imposes. Lastly, the significance of international norms and practices in determining "evolving standards of decency" under the Eighth Amendment is finally recognized. This recognition of the beginning of the end is explicit in Justice Breyer's dissent and is also fundamental in evaluating Justice Kennedy's position if confronted with a facial challenge notwithstanding his joining the majority in Glossip v. Gross. 21 As the quintessential swing vote of the nine Justice Court, Justice Kennedy's vote on the issue is inevitably a focus for the prospects of abolition of the death penalty. Given the current vacancy on the Court, this article will also address the potential outcome from a nine Justice Court with a newly appointed Justice.
I. AN EMERGING ABOLITION COALITION ON THE COURT?
It is routine to predict the future direction of Supreme Court opinions in the current Supreme Court by the so-called swing vote of Justice Kennedy, even though the Court appears to have had more cohesive decisions under Chief Justice Roberts than in years past. 23 That said, Justice Kennedy's voting pattern since his appointment in 1988 in death penalty cases is illuminating as to his possible accord with Justice Breyer's call for abolition of the death penalty as cruel and unusual 21 27 and then in 1977 prohibited its imposition for rape of an adult in Coker.
28 Justice Kennedy had barely served a year on the Court before confronting two cases in which categorical exclusions from the penalty were unsuccessfully sought, and he joined in that result in 1989. 29 As the junior Justice at that time, his departure from the accepted "national consensus" analytical framework must have been striking, and just sixteen years later-a brief time by constitutional measure-both cases were overruled with Justice Kennedy's support. 30 In Penry v. Lynaugh the Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer two questions: first, did Penry's death sentence violate the Eighth Amendment because the jury was unable to consider mitigating evidence in answering the special questions, and second, is it cruel and unusual punishment to execute a "mentally retarded" person of Penry's capabilities? 31 The Court had previously determined in Teague v. Lane that relief that, if granted, would constitute a "new rule" cannot be announced or applied retroactively to a petitioner's case, barring two exceptions. 32 Although Teague was not a capital case, the Court determined both the general concept that new rules should not be retroac- (1989) . A "new rule" is one that imposes a new obligation on the government, one that was not dictated by precedent at the time of the initial trial's conclusion. Id. The two exceptions were if the new rule placed certain primary private acts or conduct beyond the power of criminal law to proscribe, or if the new rule corrects an inaccuracy at trial that implicated the fundamental fairness of the trial. Id. at 311-12. Neither exception applied to this aspect of Penry's case, but the first exception was expanded in Part IV-A regarding Penry's claim that the Eighth Amendment entirely barred the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 329-30. tive and the specific exceptions that would allow retroactive application to death penalty cases.
33
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court then, examined if Penry's request that his jury be required to consider any mitigating evidence before assigning the death penalty was a new rule under Teague. 34 If so, the mitigating evidence could not be applied retroactively to Penry's case on collateral appeal. 35 The Court in 2016 would address the issue of whether the exclusion of a life sentence without parole for juveniles in Miller should be applied retroactively under Teague.. 36 The Court held that Penry had a constitutional guarantee that his jury must consider any such mitigating evidence before passing a death sentence. 37 Therefore, Penry's request was not for a new rule, but for Texas to follow its extant constitutional obligation to ensure that the jury would consider all relevant mitigating evidence Penry may present during the sentencing in a capital case.
38
The Court then turned to Penry's first issue: whether the special questions presented to the jury during the penalty phase of his trial violated his constitutional rights by leaving the jury unable to properly consider mitigating evidence when contemplating the death penalty. 39 The Court reiterated that Texas's procedure is only constitutional if the special questions allow for consideration of mitigating factors, 40 and that a sentencing party not only may consider mitigating evidence but must consider it in capital cases. 41 The Court found the underlying legal reasoning for these rules was that "punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant," 42 Although the Court agreed with the state that Penry's mental retardation was relevant to the first special question-whether Penry had acted, or was capable of acting, deliberately-it also had great relevance to Penry's moral culpability for his crime, which is beyond the scope of the question. 44 The state argued that, despite the narrowness of the special questions, the jurors were still free to vote their conscience if they believed that there were mitigating factors which would lead them to be merciful to Penry, and in fact, the defense counsel urged the jury to do so in the interest of justice. 45 Nevertheless, because the prosecution explicitly told the jury in rebuttal that the jurors had taken an oath to follow the law, and must follow their instructions as given, the Court found that "a reasonable juror could well have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence." 46 Therefore, the Court concluded that Penry's case should be remanded for resentencing to avoid the risk that the death penalty would be imposed in spite of factors that may call for something less severe. 47 The Court finally turned to Penry's second issue on appeal: whether the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of a "mentally retarded" defendant. 48 Because there was no established rule that the Eighth Amendment prevented the execution of the "mentally retarded" at the time of Penry's conviction, the Court held that this would constitute a "new rule" under Teague. 49 However, the first exception to Teague is that a new rule may be retroactive on collateral appeal if it placed "primary conduct" of the petitioner beyond the scope of criminal law. 50 In the Court's view, "a new rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the State's power to punish by death is analogous to a new rule 43 52 The Court reiterated that the Eighth Amendment prohibited at a minimum punishments considered cruel and unusual in the English common law at the time the Amendment was adopted, but was not limited to practices condemned by the common law in 1789. 53 Generally, the common law prohibited punishment of "idiots" and "lunatics" for crimes committed due to their disabilities. 54 This prohibition was the precursor to the modern insanity defense. 55 "Idiot" had no standardized definition at common law, but "was generally used to describe persons who had a total lack of reason or understanding, or an inability to distinguish between good and evil." 56 The Court found some similarities between the common law definition of an "idiot" who could not be punished for his crimes, and the modern view of mental retardation; however, the Court saw the common law definition as applying to people "wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions," which is more analogous to someone with "severe" or "profound" retardation rather than someone of Penry's capacity. 57 Penry's insanity defense was rejected and he was found competent to stand trial.
In addition, unlike what the Court found with regard to the insane, for whom there was a national consensus against execution, 58 only two states had statutes against executing the mentally retarded for capital crimes, one of which had yet to go into effect. 59 Even taking into account the fourteen states prohibiting capital punishment altogether, the Court found no national consensus against executing the mentally retarded that would justify expanding the common law definition of cruel 51 Justice O'Connor considered the retribution theory of criminal punishment and its basis in proportion to the culpability of the offender with regards to mental retardation, which "has long been regarded as a factor that may diminish an individual's culpability for a criminal act." 62 However, O'Connor found she could not "conclude that all mentally retarded people of Penry's ability-by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart from any individualized consideration of their personal responsibility-inevitably lack the . . . capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty," and that mental retardation was better viewed as a mitigating factor in capital sentencing than an absolute bar.
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The Fifth Circuit's judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for sentencing procedures that would allow Penry to present evidence of his mental retardation and history of abuse as mitigating factors against sentencing him to death. 64 However, the Court found no absolute Eighth Amendment protection against the execution of the mentally retarded. 65 Instead, the Court viewed that common law ban as applicable to only those considered "severely" or "profoundly" retarded, with an IQ of 40 or below. 66 On this second issue, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, with Brennan noting that the punishment was unconstitutional under both a proportionality analysis weighing the gravity of the offense with the harshness of the penalty, and as failing to further the penal goals of deterrence or retribution.
67
It is impossible to view the Court's references to "idiots," "lunatics," and the "mentally retarded," however historically justified, without recognizing that public and scientific understanding of intellectual disabil- ities and mental illness have changed dramatically as part of the national consensus (although it would be 2014 before Justice Kennedy would substitute "intellectually disabled" for the earlier label of "mental retardation"). 68 In a 1989 case decided the same day as Penry, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky that the death penalty was not cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles over 15 but under 18 at the time of the crime. 69 Although Justice Scalia would have started and ended the analysis with what punishment was allowed by the national consensus of states, 70 Justice O'Connor separately concurred in the lack of consensus and ultimately the judgment, concluding that the Court should have conducted a proportionality analysis before reaching its conclusion. 71 Justice Brennan, joined in his dissent by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, took note of "what Justice Scalia calls, with evident but misplaced disdain, 'ethicoscientific' evidence" to determine whether the punishment was disproportionate or served no legitimate penal goal. 72 The dissent goes on to cite as relevant that "within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved. 79 In that opinion, Justice Kennedy would write at the outset that the Atkins decision "returned to the rule, established in decisions predating Stanford, that 'the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.'" 80 Ironically, the petitioner in Roper argued that there was no national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles based in part on the United States' ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a reservation to preserve capital punishment for juveniles. 81 The opinion found that to be only "faint support," particularly when considered with subsequent Congressional legislation abolishing the punishment for federal crimes committed by juveniles.
82
In addition to finding a state consensus against the death penalty's imposition, the Roper opinion predominantly focused on the "unreliability" of juveniles being classified among the worst offenders, and concomitantly the failure of the death penalty to serve any penological justification for juvenile offenders. 83 Most significantly from the perspective of global realism, Part IV of the opinion focuses on the "reality" of 76. See 536 U.S. 304 (2002). As often seems to be the case, even those decisions which garner the most public attention when decided, disappear from the public domain of discussion with respect to their individual outcomes. What happens after many of the Supreme Court death penalty decisions also indicates that the death penalty system is arbitrary and fatally flawed. Atkins is one such example, which highlights the inability of juries to give the objective, individual consideration to mitigating circumstances required by the Court's decisions. On remand, the jury would again find that Atkins was intellectually disabled. Atkins was spared the death penalty due to the judge's determination that the evidence that Atkins was the triggerman was obtained by prosecutorial misconduct. the United States being the only country that gave "official sanction" to the juvenile death penalty. 84 Only the United States and Somalia had not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which prohibits the penalty, and Somalia had not executed a juvenile offender since before 1990. 85 From this Justice Kennedy concludes:
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the crime. See Brief for Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11. The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions. It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom. 96 The Court agreed that after a defendant makes a "substantial showing of incompetency," Ford entitles him to "among other things, an adequate means by which to submit expert psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence that had been solicited by the state court." 97 The Ford standard does not specify exact procedures for the state to follow, but requires a "fair hearing" on the issue of the petitioner's competency, one in which the petitioner has an opportunity to be heard and whose ultimate evaluation is based on more than the findings of psychiatrists appointed by the state. 98 The Court found that for Panetti's case, the state was deficient in its procedures due to a lack of adequate recordkeeping, a failure to keep Panetti and his counsel informed throughout the proceedings, a failure to provide a competency hearing, and a failure to allow Panetti to submit any evidence in response to the court-appointed psychiatrists' evaluations.
99
The Court did not rule on whether Ford requires specific procedures such as the opportunity for discovery or ability to cross-examine witnesses. 100 Instead, the Court found that Texas's procedure regarding Panetti was so clearly deficient in other ways as to render further questions unnecessary. 101 Citing to Ford, the Court held that it did not need to defer to the state court's finding of competency because Texas's procedure was inadequate for ascertaining the truth at trial.
102
The Court then turned to Panetti's question as to whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness deprived him of the capacity to understand he is being executed as a punishment for a crime. 103 The Court looked to the record to see what specific form Panetti's illness took to determine if he was unable to be executed. 104 Four expert witnesses testified on Panetti's behalf during the District Court proceedings. 105 They explained that Panetti suffered from delusions related to his execution, such that he had mentally recast himself as a warrior for God after his sentence, with the state attempting to execute him to stop him from preaching. 106 The state argued that Panetti was still at times clear and lucid and could sufficiently understand the concept of his execution to be considered competent. 107 The Court of Appeals ultimately found Panetti competent via a three-part test based on the Court's holding in Ford:
108 first, that Panetti was aware he committed the murders; second, that Panetti was aware he would be executed; and third, that Panetti was aware that his crimes were the reason the state gave for his execution. 109 The appeals court found that while Panetti's delusions may have caused him to disbelieve the state's reasons for executing him and to be unable to rationally understand them, his awareness of the state's reasoning was sufficient. 110 The Court held that the appeals court's standards were based on a misunderstanding of Ford that found a condemned prisoner's delusions irrelevant for the purposes of determining comprehension or awareness of his punishment. 111 The Court instead looked to the Ford court's justification for capital punishment for guidance, specifically that the interests of retribution are only served if the offender at last recognizes the gravity of his crime. 112 This recognition would affirm for the surviving family and friends of the victim, and the community as a whole that the prisoner is sufficiently culpable for his crimes and that the ultimate punishment is justified. 113 Thus, a prisoner who did not fully appreciate the reason for his punishment, and thus the severity of his crime, would call this motive for retribution into question. The Court found no support in Ford or the common law for the idea that a prisoner could be denied the ability to demonstrate incompetence merely because he could identify the stated reason for his execution. 115 Instead, the Court held that Panetti's stated delusions were so severe as to render his ability to comprehend the meaning and purpose of his punishment doubtful. 116 Thus, the Ford test for competency must include an evaluation of the petitioner's mental state with regard to any delusional beliefs he or she may have. 117 Although the Court rejected the appeals court's standard, it did not impose a specific rule to govern all competency determinations. 118 It instead preferred to leave questions of that complexity unaddressed until the lower courts fully addressed the nature and severity of Panetti's mental problems in a more definite manner and in light of all expert evidence. 119 The Court reversed the appeals court's judgment and remanded Panetti's case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
120
In Kennedy, 121 the Court considered the proportionality precedents established in Roper 122 and Atkins, 123 whereby diminished responsibility prevented application of the death penalty for homicide cases. Such 115. Id. at 959. The Court additionally recognized that the concept of "rational understanding" was difficult to identify, and that one could argue many criminals will fail to understand why they are being punished for reasons other than mental illness, including extreme callousness towards human life and the severity of their crimes or a level of self-centeredness that would prevent them from ever taking full responsibility for their actions. The Court distinguished Panetti's case from these hypotheticals by specifying that the doubting of Panetti's competence is not founded in "a misanthropic personality or an amoral character," but a psychotic disorder. The Court acknowledged that while thirty-seven jurisdictions impose the death penalty, only six of those jurisdictions authorized the death penalty for rape of a child. 128 The Court further emphasized that while national consensus is not confined to tallying the number of states with applicable death penalty legislation, significantly, in 45 jurisdictions the petitioner could not be executed for the rape of a minor. 129 Overall, the Court held that "evidence of a national consensus with respect to the death penalty for child rapists, as with respect to juveniles, mentally retarded and vicarious felony offenders, shows divided opinion but, on balance, an opinion against imposing capital punishment."
130
Despite the Court's acknowledgement that those who rape deserve serious punishment, it held that "in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life."
131 As the penalty for the rape of a minor was not addressed in Coker, the Court The Court rejected such an argument as "it is not our practice, nor is it sound, to find contemporary norms based upon state legislation that has been proposed but not yet enacted."
134 Furthermore, as the change towards imposing capital punishment for rape of a minor is only evidenced by six new death penalty statutes, three enacted in the last two years, there "is not an indication of a trend or change in direction comparable to the one supported by data in Roper."
135
Justice Kennedy's opinion went on to note that execution statistics confirm social consensus against the death penalty for non-deadly child rape. 136 The statistics show that, although nine states permitted capital punishment for rape for some length of time after the Court's 1972 decision in Furman, 137 Louisiana was the only state since 1964 that has sentenced an individual to death for the crime of child rape.
138 Furthermore, no execution for any other non-homicide offense has been conducted since 1963. 139 As such, the Court concluded that the statistics provided show "a national consensus against capital punishment for the crime of child rape."
140
Despite the opinion's detailed scrutiny of whether there was a "national consensus" in either direction, Justice Kennedy's opinion asserted that ultimately it was the Court's own judgment which should be brought to bear on the death penalty's constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, not the consensus of the states. 141 The Court noted the importance of confined implementation of the death penalty to ensure punishment is "exercised within the limits of civilized standards" 142 and structured so as to "prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion." 143 In Enmund, the Court decided that the death penalty for the crime of vicarious felony murder is disproportionate to the offense, 144 while Coker held capital punishment to be "an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."
145 Thus, the Court found that it is not only the death penalty which is "unique in its severity and irrevocability," 146 but there is also a distinction between intentional first-degree murders on the one hand and non-homicide crimes against individual persons, including child rape, on the other: 147 We have developed a foundational jurisprudence in the case of capital murder to guide the States and juries in imposing the death penalty. Starting with Gregg, we have spent more than 32 years articulating limiting factors that channel the jury's discretion to avoid the death penalty's arbitrary imposition in the case of capital murder. Though that practice remains sound, beginning the same process for crimes for which no one has been executed in more than 40 years would require experimentation in an area where a failed experiment would result in the execution of individuals undeserving of the death penalty. 148 The Court held that the fact there are more reported incidents of child rape than first-degree murder 149 and that the 36 States that permit the death penalty could sentence to death all persons convicted of raping a child less than 12 years of age, could not be reconciled with our evolving standards of decency and the necessity to constrain the use of the death penalty.
150
The opinion concluded with its evaluation that the imposition of the death penalty for such crimes would serve no legitimate penological purpose. 151 when it is grossly out of proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes. 153 Atkins 154 noted that the goal of retribution reflects the interests of the victim and society in seeing that the offender is punished for the hurt he caused. 155 In respect of Kennedy, the Court noted that it is not evident that the victim's hurt is lessened when the law permits the death of the perpetrator. 156 Furthermore, "enlisting the child victim to assist it over the course of years in asking for capital punishment forces a moral choice on the child, who is not of mature age to make that choice."
157 Finally, the Court noted the problem of "unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony means there is a 'special risk of wrongful execution' in some child rape cases," which would not fulfill any retributive value.
158
Rather than being a deterrent, the death penalty for non-deadly child rape may have the opposite effect by increasing the risk of nonreporting of offences. "One of the most commonly cited reasons for nondisclosure is fear of negative consequences for the perpetrator, a concern that has special force where the abuser is a family member."
159
In addition, a state that punishes child rape by death may remove an incentive for the rapist not to kill the victim. 160 The Court dismissed any concerns that its approach intruded upon the consensus-making process, as the Eighth Amendment is first and foremost defined by "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 161 Accordingly, the Court "becomes enmeshed in the process, part judge and part the maker of that which it judges," but that "the rule of evolving standards of decency with specific marks on the way to full progress and mature judgment means that resort to the penalty must be reserved for the worst of crimes and limited in its instances of application." In Kennedy, after performing the obligatory assessment of national consensus, Justice Kennedy asserts that regardless of that determination, the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment for the category of crime as disproportionate and served no legitimate purpose of criminal punishment. 164 When Justice Kennedy points out that the Court has spent 32 years trying to individualize determinations of capital sentencing, resulting in "tension and imprecision," and an approach which "might" be sound with respect to capital murder, the tone is almost one of exasperation in refusing to take that approach where death of the victim has not occurred. 168 Montgomery, 17 years old when he killed a deputy sheriff then 69, had spent "almost his entire life" in prison. 169 The issue revolved around whether Miller's pronouncement that the penalty was inappropriate except for crimes that "reflect permanent incorrigibility" was therefore only a procedural limitation on state sentencing, or a substantive exclusion of a category of offenders. 170 Reciting proportionality analysis and lack of penological purpose from 
171
Finding no possibility of a "valid" (that is, reliable) result for such offenders, the opinion added that "even the use of impeccable fact-finding procedures could not legitimate a verdict" where "the conduct being penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment."
172
The full implication of Kennedy's opinion was certainly not lost on Justice Scalia:
This whole exercise, this whole distortion of Miller, is just a devious way of eliminating life without parole for juvenile offenders. The Court might have done that expressly (as we know, the Court can decree anything) but that would have been something of an embarrassment. After all, one of the justifications the Court gave for decreeing an end to the death penalty for murders (no matter how many) committed by a juvenile was that life without parole was a severe enough punishment. How could the majority-in an opinion written by the very author of Roper-now say that punishment is also unconstitutional? The Court expressly refused to say so in Miller. So the Court refuses again today, but merely makes imposition of that severe sanction a practical impossibility. And then, in Godfather fashion, the majority makes states legislatures an offer they can't refuse: Avoid all the utterly impossible nonsense we have prescribed by simply 'permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be consider for parole. Mission accomplished. abuse or poverty, away from juries as well? Surely jurors "overpower [ed] " by "the brutality or cold-blooded nature" of a crime, . . . could not adequately weigh these mitigating factors either. 174 As one authority on death penalty jurisprudence has noted, the Atkins-Roper unreliability factors provide the potential of an overall challenge to the death penalty, by calling into question "the Court's most fundamental post-Furman promise that reliability can be assured be- As this author noted in 2003 shortly before Roper was decided, "The Supreme Court cannot avoid the internationalization of domestic law, as the five prominent international law cases on its docket this past term demonstrate." 182 Justice Breyer suggests that the interaction of judges and lawyers from different countries may be more influential than if or how other countries' legal decisions are cited. 183 In his book's introduction, Justice Breyer states unequivocally that he believes "it important for Americans to understand and to appropriately apply international and foreign law." 184 In a speech to the Appellate Judges Education Institute on November 12, 2015, he added that looking abroad to other similar institutions is necessary to "solve" major international problems such as the environment and security. 185 Most nations have abolished the death penalty. Of the 193 members of the United Nations, 95 have formally eliminated it while 42 others have ceased using it in practice. 186 Furthermore, in 2013 only 22 countries carried out an execution and only 8 executed more than 10 people. 187 The nations included in the eight nations that regularly execute people are ones with which the United States does not typically try to align itself on human rights issues (China, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen). 188 In 2013 no execution took place in Europe or the Americas outside of the United States. 189 There has been continuing pressure in the international community to eradicate the death penalty. Beginning in 1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that laid out steps to abolish the death penalty. 190 Since then, opposition has grown worldwide with the number of nations opposed to capital punishment doubling. 191 In 2014, the General Assembly voted on a resolution by a vote of 117-37 (with 34 abstentions) that called for a global moratorium on capital punishment. 192 This was the fifth time since 2007 that the General Assembly had voted on such a resolution, with opposition to the death penalty increasing over time. 193 Just since 1989, 67 nations have abolished capital punishment.
194
Opposition to capital punishment has existed in Europe for many years. In 1962, a report to the Council of Europe revealed that "[a]n impartial glance at the facts clearly shows the death penalty [was] regarded in Europe as an anachronism.
195 By 1994, twenty countries had ratified the Sixth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which outlawed the death penalty in peacetime. 196 Currently, all of Western Europe has abolished the death penalty.
197
In light of capital punishment's rarity, the United States' continued use of it has led to collateral consequences in the international community due to potential violations of treaties to which the U.S. is a party. Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (which the United States has ratified), local authorities are obligated to inform all detained foreigners "without delay" of their right to request consular notification of their detention and their right to demand an opportunity to speak with their consular representatives. 198 In 2004, local and state authorities failed to carry out this obligation by not informing 51 Mexican nationals of this right, ultimately leading to an executive order calling on the states to comply with an ICJ decision as a matter of "comity" from President Bush and a case brought by Texas before the Supreme Court to establish its legal right to proceed with executions. 199 All 51 of these individuals were sentenced to death. 200 The International Court of Justice held that the states were in violation of the treaty and should "review and reconsider" the cases, 201 but Texas refused to honor this judgment and indicated its intention to execute 15 death row inmates. 202 In Medellin v. Texas, Medellín being one of the 51 Mexicans in Avena, the Supreme Court held that the ICJ's decision was not self-executing and as such was not enforceable as domestic law.
203 Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, finding that the treaty, and thus the judgment of the ICJ in Avena, was self-executing and enforceable against the states including Texas. 204 The availability of the death penalty in the United States has led to difficulties in seeking extradition from countries without the death penalty, particularly in Western Europe. In 1986, the United States sought extradition of German national Jens Soering, an 18-year-old student at the University of Virginia charged with killing his girlfriend's parents, from the United Kingdom, which refused to do so unless there were assurances that the death penalty not be imposed or carried out. 205 Soering filed a petition seeking to have the European Court of Human Rights declare that he could not be extradited to the U.S., as it would violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights prohibiting inhuman or degrading treatment. 206 The Court agreed that extradition violated Article 3, due to a "real risk" of Soering being executed in Virginia despite the United States' assurances to the contrary and the "death row phenomenon" (essentially the conditions inherent in being on death row). 207 The result is that the U.S. must seek assurances from the state that the death penalty will not be imposed before seeking extradition, with the state making the decision whether to insist on the death penalty at the expense of no extradition, whatever interests the U.S. might have in obtaining extradition of any individual.
In addition, the United States has signed the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 208 Given the unequal administration of the death penalty in terms of race in the United States, it has been argued that the United States is in violation of this treaty. 209 The Convention also prohibits the intentional imposition of physical or psychological abuse against people who are being detained. 210 Given the long delays between entry of a death sentence and executions during which inmates on death row are kept in solitary confinement as well as the torment that the appeals process often causes, in which a prisoner might on multiple occasions have an execution date set only to have it delayed, it can be argued that the United States is imposing psychological abuse. 211 In several cases the European Court of Human Rights found that prolonged solitary confinement is torture under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 212 Furthermore, execution by any means could be construed as physical abuse under international norms, since errors leading to prolonged deaths are not uncommon. 215 What is overlooked is how the current Justices exemplify the global realities themselves in various ways, traveling internationally on a regular basis, having immigrant parents, studying abroad and teaching abroad. Indeed, as noted earlier, the impetus for Glossip v. Gross was the refusal of foreign companies to provide sodium thiopental or pentobarbital for executions in the United States.
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III. MAKING THE CASE FOR SUPREME COURT ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, SOONER RATHER THAN LATER Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross. It would be easy to include her vote against the death penalty and move on as being simply one more vote, but the significance of her joining in the dissent has broader implications for the decisions of the remaining members of the Court. Justice Ginsburg is not one to call for such a bold transition lightly. Despite her pop culture characterization as the "Notorious RBG" in part for her staunch advocacy of women's rights, 217 she is a cautious, incremental advocate. In an editorial by Irin Carmon, she is quoted as advising young women, "My advice is fight for the things that you care about. . . . Fair enough-banal enough really . . . . But do it in a way that will lead others to join you." 218 The editorial goes on to quote an ACLU colleague in her confirmation hearing: "'Present the court with the next logical step,' she urged us, and then the next and then the next. 'Don't ask them to go too fast, or you'll lose what you might have won.'" 219 Abolishing the death penalty, then, is the next logical step for the Court. Just a few weeks after Glossip, Justice Ginsburg spoke about it and other prominent cases from the term to an audience of Duke alumni and students at the D.C. Summer Institute on Law and Policy. When asked why she and Justice Breyer had called for a review of the death penalty's constitutionality, she said: "Justice Breyer was speaking on the basis of his experience for 21 years, what he had seen in the Court's effort to create a capital punishment that could be administered with an even hand, and he concluded for reasons that he set out at length that it couldn't be achieved. . . . "
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And so did she. Thus, two of the Justices with the most experience on the Court (only Justice Kennedy having more) have concluded that the death penalty is a failed experiment under Gregg. 222 In that same conversation, Justice Ginsburg went on to emphasize her admiration for how Justice Thurgood Marshall as a civil rights advocate and stepby-incremental-step chipped away at racially discriminatory provisions until none could be left standing. She acknowledged keeping in her office Justice Marshall's volume of the opinions he had written which had not been accepted by a majority of the Court. 223 Her vote in Glossip cannot be dismissed, on or off the Court, as a "liberal" vote. The significance of her vote also would not be lost on Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.
Again, it would be simplistic to count the votes of these latter two Justices as potential "liberal" votes against the death penalty. Indeed, they dissented separately from Justice Breyer in Glossip, but no less rigorously in their analysis. Finding that the Court's determination that midazolam poses on objectively intolerable risk of severe pain is "factually wrong," 224 these dissenters (also joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg) reserved their most forceful objection to the majority's interpretation of the plurality opinion in Baze v. Rees regarding the constitutional insufficiency of midazolam as a sedative in a three-drug lethal injection cocktail, and by imposing a wholly unprecedented obligation on the condemned inmate to identify an available means for his or her own execution. The contortions necessary to save this particular lethal injection protocol are not worth the price. 226 The recent so-called "liberal" term of the Court has been attributed to splintering opinions of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito even with agreed outcomes and the leadership of Justice Ginsburg. 227 Justice Kennedy voted with the liberals (Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor) eight times and the other Justices five times (compared to leaning to the right two-thirds of the time in previous terms) in the thirteen cases this past term decided by a five to four vote.
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Close scrutiny of the recent Supreme Court decisions on the death penalty and the assignment of those opinions reveals another significant factor for future death penalty jurisprudence. Since 1989, Justice Kennedy has written all of the majority opinions limiting the death penalty except for two decisions, Brumfield 229 and Miller 230 , as noted above. 231 Justice Kennedy, as senior Justice in those majorities, assigned those opinions to the most junior Justices who wrote opinions accepted by all of the majority. In Miller, Justice Breyer wrote a short concurring opinion, which begins with, "I join the Court's opinion in full."
232 In Glossip, Chief Justice Roberts assigned the majority opinion not to Scalia, Thomas or even Kennedy, but to Justice Alito. 233 Justice Scalia joined the opinion in one phrase, and dedicated the rest of his opinion to addressing Justice Breyer's dissent. 234 Justice Thomas, however, joined the majority opinion using a different test than that posed by Justice Alito, which rejected the reasoning of Baze by suggesting that the Eighth Amendment prohibits only methods of execution "deliberately designed to inflict pain," citing his concurrence in the Baze judgment only. 235 The remainder of his opinion (and part of Justice Scalia's)
attacking the empirical evidence employed by Justice Breyer, echoes, as John Donohue points out in this issue, the Justice Stevens/Justice Scalia debate over the relevance of empirical data in Baze.
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Justice Kennedy is notably silent beyond joining in the opinion. On a normative level, the majority opinion offers two reasons for affirming the Court of Appeals decision denying the prisoners' application for a preliminary injunction against execution:
First, the prisoners failed to identify a known and available alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61 (2008) (plurality opinion). Second, the District Court did not commit clear error when it found that the prisoners failed to establish that Oklahoma's use of a massive dose of midazolam in its execution protocol entails a substantial risk of severe pain.
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Nothing in Justice Kennedy's joinder in this opinion poses any analytical inconsistency, much less barrier, to his joining in an opinion that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. Nor is it necessary to overrule Baze to find the death penalty categorically violates the Amendment. To obtain any preliminary injunction, the petitioners must establish a likelihood of success on the merits. 238 The plurality opinion in Baze provided so little guidance as to the constitutional limits on methods of execution that no outcome on the merits might be deemed "likely." With respect to this specific method of execution, the district court did not commit clear error in its factual determination that the evidence failed to establish that the protocol entailed a substantial risk of severe pain according to the majority. 239 Procedurally, Glossip on its facts failed to meet the standard for a preliminary injunction or to provide the necessary evidentiary basis as to pain inflicted by the protocol.
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The only significant normative precedent of the Glossip majority opinion is the imposition of a requirement on prisoners to identify a "known and available alternative method of execution." 241 It is this purported requirement, supported only by a "see" citation to the plurality opinion in Baze, 242 that triggered the dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg and which necessitated the footnote in Justice Alito's opinion defining the holding in Baze (given that only Justices Kennedy and Alito joined in the reasoning of the Chief Justice's opinion in Baze).
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Beyond procedural hurdles and searching for some common thread in a fractured Court decision, Baze is a very slender reed on which to find a method of execution (which Justice Sotomayor twice calls "the chemical equivalent of burning alive" 244 ) or the death penalty, to be sufficiently humane under the Eighth Amendment. 245 Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas dismiss years of credible empirical evidence on the discriminatory and otherwise arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, yet require of prisoner-petitioners in Glossip to advance clear evidence medically and scientifically that a method of execution imposes a severe level of pain.
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IV. WHY ABOLITION BY THE SUPREME COURT AND WHY NOW Justice Breyer's invitation for a categorical death penalty challenge before the Court has ignited a discussion as to when and how such a challenge might be brought. 247 It has been suggested that veteran litigators favor an incremental, more cautious strategy, challenging the penalty's implementation in the courts (for example, seeking a categorical exclusion for execution of the mentally ill) and seeking state-by- 248 Even assuming that is the case, there is a veteran litigator on the Court known for her incremental and cautious approach who has now gone on record for a challenge to be brought now. 249 There are cases in the pipeline that can be utilized. 250 It would not be difficult to find a mentally ill petitioner to challenge both execution of the mentally ill and the death penalty generally as cruel and unusual punishment. 251 The likelihood of every death penalty case to come before the Court containing a general Eighth Amendment challenge if possible procedurally is a virtual professional prerequisite after Breyer's and Ginsburg's invitation to counsel to do so. On May 31, 2016, the Court denied certiorari in Tucker v. Louisiana, in which the defendant's counsel echoed Breyer's dissent. Tucker barely qualified for the death penalty imposed as he was 18 at the time of the killing and had an I.Q. of 74. Moreover, he was sentenced in Caddo Parish, which imposes more death sentences per capita than any other parish or county in the United States. 252 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented from the denial of certiorari, with Breyer in his dissent suggesting that the sentence was the arbitrary result of the county in which he committed the crime. 253 The denial of certiorari itself was in keeping with the Court's avoidance of deciding the remaining high profile in the Court's term during the vacancy, and hardly surprising or inauspicious for similar challenges for that reason. It is significant, however, that Justice Breyer chose to renew his position in Glossip in a written dissent from a denial of certiorari.
There is another casualty of the death penalty, and that is the public perception of the integrity of the Supreme Court. Linda Greenhouse, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist for her coverage of the Supreme Court, exposed the "death trap" of the Supreme Court in connection to Glossip and other cases and its impact on public perception of the objectivity of the Court. 254 Furthermore, Adam Liptak, the Supreme Court respondent for the New York Times, discussed a death row petitioner, Charles F. Warner, who brought a challenge to Oklahoma's lethal-injection protocol, and sought a stay of his execution. 255 Over four dissenting votes, the stay was denied and Oklahoma executed the prisoner within hours. 256 A week later, three identically situated prisoners brought Glossip, and were granted a stay of execution through a stay of the lower court decision when the Court took their petition. 257 It takes five Justices to grant a stay, but only four to hear a case, a lifeand-death procedural difference. 258 It is not the only instance in which a stay of execution has come and gone without explanation. 259 Greenhouse's final paragraph is prescient:
In 2008, two years before he retired, Justice John Paul Stevens renounced the death penalty. His nuanced opinion in Baze v. Rees rewards rereading. No current justice has taken up the call. I'm not so naïve as to predict that a majority of the Supreme Court will declare the death penalty unconstitutional anytime soon. But the voice of even one member of the court could set a clarifying marker to which others would have to respond. And it just might over time point the way to freeing the court-and the rest of us-from the machinery of death.
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Two months later, Justice Breyer would issue his dissent in Glossip. One year later, this author is hopeful enough (or naïve enough to those who disagree) that a challenge can be mounted now before many more executions occur.
As this article was being presented, Justice Scalia died, leaving a vacancy on the Court which immediately flared into partisan politics. 261 The thrust of this article was that a Court with Justice Scalia might already be prepared to find the death penalty unconstitutional. Whatever the political bent, perceived or actual, of a Supreme Court nominee, it would be unusual for that inclination to be coupled with the level of skepticism toward empirical evidence of Justices Scalia and Thomas. This conclusion of possible if not probable abolition remains the same even if a newly elected Republican president were to appoint a Scaliaequivalent justice to the Court. The vacancy on the Court could be an opportunity to restore the image of thoughtful justice to the Court, an opportunity that may already have been lost but not irretrievably. No single issue, pro or con, should be a political litmus test for appointment to the Court if the Court is to rise above the partisan polarization of the other branches. Having left the New York Times after three decades to join academia, Linda Greenhouse is open about the need for "resetting the post-Scalia Court." 262 As Justice Scalia's opinions became more vitriolic the Court seemed to reflect the harsh and often disgraceful rhetoric of the Presidential primaries. In her editorial, Greenhouse refers to an article by law Professor Neal Devins and political science professor Lawrence Baum, that explores how party polarization may have infected the Court's objectivity and at the least damaged the public's perception of its objectivity. 263 Hopefully, political liberals and conservatives will recognize this need, at some point in the future acknowledge that it is not unprecedented for a President to appoint a Supreme Court Justice in an election year, and reinstate judicial thoughtfulness and integrity as the goal, not "stacking" the Court.
The final words are those of Justice Breyer:
In interpreting these open (constitutional) phrases, a judge may in part have to face the fact that he cannot jump out of his own skin, he cannot escape his own background, and he is guided by a highly general jurisprudential philosophy that he will likely have accepted over the course of many professional years. I went to public schools in San Francisco; I grew up during the 1950s; I am inevitably the lawyer that I am. That means in respect to views about the nature of the Constitution or of law, their relation to the people of the United States, and the way in which law affects people, I cannot escape my own general views. Law is not computer science, and those views matter. That is why it is a good thing, in a country as diverse as ours, with well over three hundred million people, that different judges have different general jurisprudential views. I should add that judges serve long terms, but over time different presidents will appoint different judges with different highly general jurisprudential views. The Court can change its nature very slowly over time. And in a few cases it can reflect, in a highly abstract general sense, the nature of the country.
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The present political fracas over whether Judge Garland 265 is even going to get a confirmation hearing before the election admittedly does not bode well for Congress to demonstrate a renewed respect for a Supreme Court above the political fray. "Liberal" or "conservative" labels do not reflect in any meaningful way on evaluating Judge Garland's record or on the actual precedent for Senate hearings and action on Supreme Court nominees during an election year (most notably and recently Justice Kennedy himself). The standard argument against having the Court decide cases involving substantial change in a societal norm-that such decisions are best left to the state legislatures as expressing the will of the people-simply has no applicability in the context of a death penalty with all of its societal and human costs imposed in only a handful of counties in a handful of states, which might not come around to the general state consensus in practice for any number of years. The will of the people in such circumstances is held captive to a localized veto which does not reflect a national consensus but frustrates it, at tremendous expense in human life and public perception of 264. BREYER, supra note 176, at 277-78. 265. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Judge Garland is best known as a centrist jurist with a "meticulous work ethic" and who favors an "adherence to legal principles" rather than a strong ideological bent. 269. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court continues to struggle with ongoing issues which exemplify how the death penalty fails to comply with "evolving standards of decency." On June 6, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for the upcoming terms concerning the impacts of race, intellectual disability, and incompetent counsel in the imposition of the death penalty. In one case the prosecutor and the defendant's own expert witness stated that black defendants were more likely to be dangerous than white defendants. In the other the Court agreed to hear the appeal of a defendant with an intellectual disability who has been on death row for 36 years. In its initial announcement the Court said it would hear both the appeal on the standard used for intellectual disability and also whether 36 years on death row itself constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Two hours later the Court issued a revised order limiting review to the disability standard. 
